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If its utility function is everywhere increasing and concave, rank−dependent expected utility
shares a troubling property with expected utility −− aversion to the same moderate−stakes
risk at every wealth level implies an extreme aversion to large−stakes risks. In fact, the
problem may be even worse for rank−dependent expected utility, since the moderate−stakes
risk need not be actuarially fair.
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In addition to the long list of experimental studies questioning its validity, there are now
theoretical reasons why the expected utility model might be inappropriate. A property of
expected utility for small gambles has long been known – for any gamble ~ x and for su¢ciently
small t > 0, an expected utility maximizer with a smooth utility function prefers the gamble
t~ x to its expected value if ~ x has positive expected value. So, expected utility maximizers
are risk neutral for lotteries with su¢ciently small payo¤s. Rabin (2000) discusses the
other end of the spectrum. He shows that for any increasing, concave utility function, an
expected utility maximizer who is averse to the same moderate risk at every wealth level
must necessarily be extremely averse to large risks. In perhaps his most striking example,
somebody who turns down a 50:50 lose $100/gain $125 gamble at every wealth level must
turn down any gamble with a 50% chance of losing $600, no matter how large the gain is.
Putting his result another way, an expected utility maximizer who is averse to any single
actuarially favorable gamble at every wealth level must be extremely (even ridiculously) risk
averse over large gambles. This argument provides a severe criticism of standard expected
utility models.
The purpose of this note is to explore whether Rabin’s result holds when expected utility
is weakened. In particular, I examine the result in the context of rank-dependent expected
utility (Quiggin, 1982, 1993). There are several good reasons for doing so. First, among
nonexpected utility models, rank-dependent expected utility has received the most recent
attention and has been used in the most applications. Second, rank-dependent expected
utility exhibits …rst-order risk aversion, i.e. the risk premium for the noise variable t~ " is
proportional to t at t = 0, whereas expected utility exhibits second-order risk aversion, where
the risk premium is proportional to t2 at t = 0 (see Segal and Spivak, 1990). First-order
risk aversion has been used to explain a number of empirical anomalies, such as the purchase
of full insurance with a loading factor (Segal and Spivak, 1990), the equity-premium puzzle
(Epstein and Zin, 1990), and tax compliance (Bernasconi, 1998). Perhaps second-order
risk aversion is the driving force behind Rabin’s result. The results of the rank-dependent
expected utility analysis are fairly simple – Rabin’s negative result still holds. Furthermore,
experimental evidence and theoretical work on the shape ofthe probability weighting function
suggest that the rank-dependent result is even worse than the expected utility one. With
rank-dependent expected utility and the most common current weighting functions, aversion
to a single, appropriately chosen, actuarially unfavorable gamble at every wealth level can
lead to extreme levels of risk aversion over large gambles.
The results have two implications for Rabin’s criticism of expected utility. First, it is un-
related to the properties of approximate risk neutrality and second-order risk aversion, since
for rank-dependent expected utility approximate risk neutrality fails but Rabin’s criticism is
maintained. Second, his criticism extends to an important generalization of expected utility
theory.
Section 2 brie‡y reviews Rabin’s result for expected utility preferences. Section 3 explores
the same result for rank-dependent expected utility preferences.
2. Expected Utility
An expected utility maximizer has a preference function V (F) over probability distribu-
tions taking the form V (F) =
R
U(w +x)dF(x), where U is the utility function de…ned over
1wealth levels. Rabin’s calibration result uses the following construction:
m(k) =
8
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Rabin’s Expected Utility Calibration Theorem. Let U be twice di¤erentiable with
U0(w) > 0, U00(w) < 0 for all w. If there exists g > l > 0 such that, for all w, an expected
utility maximizer with utility function U prefers not to take a 50:50 chance of losing l and
winning g, then she also prefers not to take a 50:50 chance of losing kl and winning mg for
any positive integer k and any m < m(k) as de…ned in expression (1).
Rabin’s result takes the following form: If an individual turns down 50:50 lose l/gain g
bets at every wealth level, then the same individual also turns down a 50:50 lose kl/gain mg
bet where k is a positive integer and m is bounded by m(k) de…ned above. Some values
of l, g, and k yield an in…nite value for m(k), so that the individual will turn down any
bet involving a 50% chance of losing kl, independent of the amount of the potential gain.
Furthermore, for any g > l > 0, there exists an integer K1 < 0 such that for k ¸ K1,
m(k) = 1: This means that if the individual turns down any 50:50 lose l/gain g gamble,
there is a large enough integer K1 such that she turns down any gamble with a 50% chance














which depends only on the ratio g=l. Table 1 gives the values of K1 for di¤erent values of
g=l. As shown by the table, K1 can take on some small values, implying that the individual
is extremely risk averse. So, for example, if an individual is averse to a 50:50 chance of losing
$100 or gaining $105 at every wealth level, then she will not take any gamble with a 50%
chance of losing $900, no matter how large the gain. Even more strikingly, being averse
to a 50:50 chance of losing $l or gaining $1:5l at every wealth level means that she will not
take any gambles with a 50% chance of losing l. This is a serious criticism of the expected
utility hypothesis..
Table 1.
g=l K1 g=l K1
1.01 41 1.07 6
1.02 21 1.09 5
1.03 14 1.11 4
1.04 11 1.15 3
1.05 9 1.23 2
1.06 7 1.5 1
23. Rank-dependent expected utility
Rank-dependent expected utility preferences di¤er from expected utility preferences in
that the probability distribution is transformed before expected utility is calculated. The
function ¼ is de…ned to be a probability transformation function if it is strictly increasing with
¼(0) = 0 and ¼(1) = 1. The preference function takes the form V (F) =
R
U(w)d¼(F(w))
where U is a utility function, as before, and ¼ is a probability transformation function. Risk
attitudes are governed by both U and ¼ – if both are concave the individual is risk averse.
When there are only two outcomes, as there are in Rabin’s setting, the rank-dependent
expected utility preference function takes a very simple form. Letting pl be the probability
of the loss, the preference function takes the form ¼(pl)U(w ¡ l) + [1 ¡ ¼(pl)]U(w + g).
So, the preference function di¤ers from the expected utility preference function in that the
expectation is taken using ¼(pl) as the probability of the loss instead of pl.
Proposition 1. Let U be twice di¤erentiable with U0(w) > 0, U00(w) < 0 for all w. Let





. If there exists g > l > 0
such that, for all w, a rank-dependent expected utility maximizer with utility function U and
transformation function ¼ prefers not to take a ¹ p : (1¡ ¹ p) chance of losing l and winning g,
then she also prefers not to take a ¹ p : (1 ¡ ¹ p) chance of losing kl and winning mg for any
positive integer k and any m < m(k) as de…ned in expression (1).
Proof. If the individual prefers not to take the gamble, it must be the case that
¼(¹ p)U(w ¡ l) + [1 ¡ ¼(¹ p)]U(w + g) < U(w):
Since ¼(¹ p) = 1
2, this implies that 1
2U(w¡l)+ 1
2U(w+g) < U(w). By Rabin’s EU calibration
theorem, 1
2U(w ¡ kl) + 1
2U(w + mg) < U(w) for any positive integer k and any m < m(k)
given by (1). Thus,
¼(¹ p)U(w ¡ kl) + [1 ¡ ¼(¹ p)]U(w + mg) < U(w)
for any positive integer k and any m < m(k).
The only di¤erence between Rabin’s expected utility calibration theorem and its rank-
dependent counterpart is the probability of the loss. The conditions on the utility function
are identical. So, given an increasing concave utility function U and a probability trans-
formation function ¼, if g, l, and k satisfy the conditions of Rabin’s EU theorem, they also
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1, but using ¹ p as the probability of the loss instead of 1
2.
This is unsurprising because ¹ p is simply the solution to ¼(p) = 1
2, so that the transformed
probability distribution coincides with the 50:50 one used in Rabin’s EU calibration theorem.
Consequently, the problem posed for expected utility by Rabin’s analysis also pertains to
rank-dependent expected utility. Aversion to an appropriate moderate-stakes risk at every
wealth level implies extreme aversion to risks with large stakes.
Even though the expected utility calibration result and its rank-dependent counterpart
are very similar, their interpretations hold signi…cant di¤erences. Most experimental stud-
ies of the probability transformation function ¼, including Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Camerer and Ho(1994), Wu and Gonzales (1996), Fox, Rogers, and Tversky (1996), and Gon-
zales and Wu (1999), along with Prelec’s (1998) axiomatic characterization of the transforma-
tion function, …nd that ¼¡1(1
2) > 1
2. For Proposition 1, this means that the ¹ p : (1¡¹ p) chance
3of losing l or winning g may be actuarially unfavorable. So, for example, if ¼¡1(1
2) = 0:6, if
the individual dislikes 60:40 lose $100/win $110 gambles at every wealth level, by Proposition
1 and Table 1, that individual will not take any gamble with a 60% chance of losing $500.
Disliking the 60:40 lose $100/win $110 gamble does not require risk aversion, but instead
requires a su¢ciently small amount of risk preference. Disliking any gamble with a 60%
chance of losing $500, though, requires an extreme amount of risk aversion. Consequently,
the negative calibration result for rank-dependent expected utility using the now-standard
speci…cations of the probability transformation function is even more striking than its ex-
pected utility counterpart.
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